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THE LAWLESSNESS IN OUR COURTS
Susan P. Koniak*
Some exercises of state power are not worthy of the name of
"law." Calling something "law" does not automatically legitimize it,
but it does coat it with a veneer of legitimacy. Law, in other words,
connotes right.1 The notion of legitimacy is deeply embedded in the
word "law" by our culture, our history, and our use of language.2
Thus, for a state - indeed, for any group - to claim that its exercise of power is lawful is neither an empty claim nor a mere tautology. It is a claim that the state (or other group) has not merely
the might to act, but the right to act. "Law" not only privileges
certain exercises of state power, but it also privileges certain claims
of right. Legal claims elevate moral claims from the "ought" to the
"must." Only the law speaks in "or else" terms. Morality and philosophy ordinarily speak in gentler tones, asking for acceptance
rather than demanding it.
To say that our culture, history, and language insist on a connection between law and right is to say that few, if any of us, would
find it easy to describe as law every conceivable rule or practice
that any conceivable regime might designate as law. Rodney
Blackman made this point with a story:
[Y]ou are in a strange country. You are walking down a main
street in the largest city. Suppose that you hear a siren and notice
that it comes from a small truck coming toward you. The truck
looks like a police van. The van stops in front of you and several
uniformed men get out. Without notice to you, the men grab you,
beat you into submission with their gun handles, drag you into the
van and throw you bound hand and foot with your mouth gagged
onto the floor. The van speeds off with the siren blaring and stops
in front of a building that looks like a courthouse. You are dragged

* © 1998, Susan P. Koniak. All rights reserved. Professor of Law, Boston
University.
1. See Robert M. Cover, Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L.
REV. 179, 180-81 (1985) (describing law as a valuable resource in the complex social
game of legitimation).
2. See id. at 180 n.7. Legitimacy is so deeply embedded in the word "law" that
the central project of legal positivism - to separate the question of what is law from
the question of what is right - was doomed from the start. See id. at 180. Indeed, our
culture, history, and language are so insistent on the connection between law and right
that to call something an evil law is to grant it a legitimacy that no positivist intends,
but which none can avoid. See id.
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out of the van, and brought before someone who is dressed like a
judge. The "judge" then informs you that you are undoubtedly
guilty (without informing you of the charges), but that you are still
entitled to a trial before having the death sentence imposed. A
burly looking gentleman who claims to be your lawyer then informs the "judge" that a trial isn't necessary because you are obviously guilty. "Your lawyer" then smacks you a few times across the
face with his gun handle, apparently for the sheer joy of it. Accepting the "lawyer's" assertion that no trial is necessary, the
"judge" says, "very well, I am sentencing you to death by torture."
But before being dragged out of the "courtroom," the gag is
removed from your mouth and you are allowed to utter a few
choice thoughts. Let us assume that you try charm, flattery, bribery and threats, and nothing works. What would you say? Assuming you have embraced the legal positivist position that there is no
necessary connection between law and morality, you could still
attack what has happened to you on moral grounds. You could call
what was being done to you, "wicked, evil, indecent, immoral,
barbarous and uncivilized."
But suppose you realize from his sardonic smile that the
judge" obviously does not care one bit whether your moral sensibilities have been offended. In your rage you then seek to hurl an
invective at the "judge" which, given the "judge's" so-called job
description, might actually have some impact. So you scream, "you
call this law? This isn't law. It's a mockery of everything that law
stands for."3
If you were to believe some version of the last sentences in
Blackman's story, you would not be thinking or speaking as a legal

positivist. More important, legal positivism cannot explain why
totalitarian regimes fuss over the term "law" at all or bother with
the trappings associated with law, such as courthouses, procedures,
lawyers and judges. Why not declare, by law, that none of these
trappings are necessary and that from now on, whatever the leadership does and whenever it does it is lawful at that time and forever
more?
Instead, totalitarian regimes make great use of the power of
"law" to legitimize their actions. Consider, for example, the "trials"
held by Stalin in the 1930s to get rid of political enemies. It is important to remember that governments are not the only entities

3. Rodney J. Blackman, There Is There There: Defending the Defenseless with Procedural Natural Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 285, 294-95 (1995).
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that use law and its trappings to legitimize acts of violence. Various
elements of the militia movement in this country have established
what they call "Common Law Courts," which hold "trials" to condemn as "illegal" acts of local, state, and federal government agents
- acts that our courts contend, of course, are legal.4 These groups
spend considerable time and energy articulating what their law
demands of themselves and of us. They understand what positivists
miss: law, legitimacy, the classification of acts of violence, and the
elevation of claims of right are interdependent matters; they always
were and always will be. Thus, choosing to call something "law" is a
matter of some significance, as is refusing to call something "law."
Elsewhere I have argued that the word "law" is too important a
resource to reserve exclusively for state acts and pronouncements. 5
Here, however, my emphasis is somewhat different. Here, I want to
concentrate on the importance of denying the label of "law" to some
acts that the state calls "law," particularly the importance of lawyers denying the state's indiscriminate use of the word "law." The
bar's rhetoric maintains that the profession's independence from
the state is critically important because only an independent bar
can serve as an appropriate check on tyranny, on state force masquerading as law.6 Well, I write to say that we are falling down on
the job. Much of class action practice has lost its claim to the name
of law. Unfortunately, lawyers in position to sound the alarm are
silent. That silence must be broken.
SPEAKING OF WHAT CANNOT BE LAW
A full account of what I would consider worthy of the term
"law" is beyond what might be accomplished in this short Essay,

4. See Susan P. Koniak, When Law Risks Madness, 8 CARDOZo STUD. L. & LIT.
65, 104-105 (1996).
5. I have maintained that dignifying the alternative normative vision of private
groups with the name "law" helps us evaluate the world more fairly when comparing the
world the state's normative demands would create with that which the private group's
normative demands would create. Denying the label "law" to the normative vision of
non-state actor's law, minimizes the contribution that private groups play in shaping the
state's law. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C.
L. REV. 1389, 1404 (1992) (describing the legal profession's law and its divergence from
state law); Koniak, supra note 4, at 67-73 (describing the Common Law movement
associated with many militia groups, the world their law would create, and that law's

influence on our own).
6. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 10-11
(1988); see also Koniak, supra note 5, at 1447-60.
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and even if space were no obstacle, I fear that I would not be equal
to that task. However, just as one need not know what is true to
know that a particular statement is false, I will maintain that one
need not be able to describe fully that which is worthy of the name
of "law" to know that some things could not possibly qualify.
Returning to Blackman's example, I submit that, across a wide
spectrum of political and jurisprudential positions, the system he
describes would be considered unworthy of the name of "law." Given its normative significance and its cultural and historical centrality, what qualifies as law is bound to be an essentially contested
matter, particularly in a society as diverse as modem America.
Nonetheless, a concept may be essentially contested and, at the
same time, fairly broad areas of agreement may exist on what the
concept excludes, including agreement across groups with divergent
ideas on what the concept includes - what it means as an affirmative matter.
In a recent article, Richard Fallon identifies four models of the
Rule of Law competing for dominance in modem constitutional
debate and Supreme Court decisions.' He documents the substantial disagreement that exists on what the Rule of Law means.8
Fallon describes law as an essentially contested concept,9 but he
sees a sizable area of common ground' 9 - ground that gives the

7. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997). Fallon identifies four ideal types - historicist,
formalist, proceduralist, and substantive - that each purport to identify what is both
necessary and sufficient to the Rule of Law. See id. at 10. His claim is that each ideal
type is incomplete in that it negates the importance of values affirmed (and in his opinion, rightly so) by the other types. See id. at 56. Fallon argues that each ideal type
emphasizes values that make up strands of what it means to speak of the Rule of Law,
see id. at 6, in opposition to the rule of men, see id. at 2, or, in my shorthand, what it
means to speak of law versus lawlessness or tyranny. Fallon's thesis states:
It is a mistake to think of particular criteria as necessary in all contexts for
the Rule of Law. Rather, we should recognize that the strands of the Rule of
Law are complexly interwoven, and we should begin to consider which values
or criteria are presumptively primary under which conditions.
Id. at 6. Fallon's project is closer to that which I have claimed as mine - an affirmative account of what must be true about a system for it to qualify as a system of law.
Nonetheless, his analysis provides support for my more limited claim that substantial
agreement exists on what is unworthy of the name "law." Thus, with apologies to Professor Fallon for not engaging his creative thesis on its own terms, I will use his work as
a springboard for my claim that substantial consensus exists on what is not law.
8. See id. at 7.
9. See id.
10. See id.
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Rule of Law enough meaning to qualify as a shared concept." A
concept worth fighting over. Fallon finds common ground on "the
elements generally recognized as constitutive of the Rule of
Law."' 2 The elements Fallon claims are common to otherwise divergent understandings of the Rule of Law mirror those identified
by Lon Fuller in The Morality of Law." Fallon reduces Fuller's
eight criteria (generality, publicity, prospectivity, clarity, noncontradictoriness, capability of being followed, stability and congruence
between norms as stated and norms as applied)'4 to a somewhat
smaller number on the ground that some of the elements are redundant. 5
Fallon sets out five criteria: (1) "People must be able to understand the law and comply with it";6 (2) "[tlhe law should actually
guide people, at least for the most part";' 7 (3) "[tlhe law should
be... stable [enough] ... to facilitate planning and coordinated
action over time"; 8 (4) "[tlhe law should rule officials, including
judges [and kings], as well as ordinary citizens;" 9 and (5)
"[clourts... [that] employ fair procedures" should be charged with
enforcing the law.2"
I agree with Fallon's position that some formulation of Fuller's
list describes common ground. Although I would locate that ground
outside rather than inside the concept of law, I believe the goals
listed as criteria by Fuller and Fallon together create an outer
11. See id. at 5.
12. Id. at 4.
13. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
14. See id. at 38-39.
15. See Fallon, supra note 7, at 8 & n.27.
16. Id. at 8. Fallon should not be read as asserting that our legal system actually
meets these criteria or that any legal system could avoid departing from the principles
he lays out. See id. at 3. Instead, he consciously describes an "ideal, not a mirror of
what is done" or even possible. Id. at 4. As Fallon clearly recognizes, ideals are important precisely because they reveal the gap between what is and what we affirm law
should be. They thus provide both the ground for a meaningful critique of the present
and a direction for efforts at reform.
17. Id. at 8.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 9. Fallon describes this element as "involv[ing] instrumentalities of
impartial justice." Id. He writes: "Courts should be available to enforce the law and
should employ fair procedures." Id. I have rewritten this to remove the implication that
"courts" in and of themselves, for example and without reference to their procedures,
contribute to the legal system. I am confident that Fallon did not intend courts apart
from their procedures to count, but his sentence is not as clear on this point as it could
be.
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boundary that generates substantial agreement about what is unworthy of the name of law while allowing substantial disagreement
about what is worthy. Put more simply, few, if any of us, would call
that which falls far short of all these goals "law" or a "legal system."
As Fallon emphasizes, many of the operative terms in his list
of agreed-upon elements of law are vague. He views this vagueness
as a flaw to be fixed. After all, vagueness allows significant disagreement to continue on what the Rule of Law means. I agree that
the vagueness perpetuates disagreement, but I believe it is also
what makes agreement possible. Disagreement on fundamental
matters of principle is inevitable in a nation as large and diverse as
ours. Our central normative commitments must therefore be expressed with sufficient abstraction to permit the coexistence of
divergent understandings; otherwise, our union might dissolve.
Robert Cover attributed this insight to Joseph Caro, a brilliant
codifier of Jewish Law, a scholar and a mystic."' Caro wrote:
"[T]here is a difference between the [force needed for the] preservation of that which already exists and the [force needed for the]
initial realization of that which had not earlier existed at all."22
This difference, Caro continued, explains the different statements
made by Simeon the Just, circa 200 B.C.E., and Rabbi Simeon ben
Gamaliel speaking three hundred years later. Simeon the Just said:
"Upon three things the world stands: upon Torah; upon the temple
worship service; and upon deeds of kindness."' Conversely, Rabbi
Simeon ben Gamaliel stated: "Upon three things the world [continues to] exist]: upon justice, upon truth, and upon peace. "' The
forces necessary to create a world of shared normative meaning
must be "culture-specific designs of particularist meaning."25 In
contrast, the forces necessary to maintain a world of shared normative meaning are "weak" forces, or broad principles capable of ensuring the coexistence of worlds whose normative understanding on
the specifics diverge from one another.26 Contrast the many culture-specific references in our Declaration of Independence, which
21. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12 (1983).
22. Id. (quoting JOSEPH CARO, BErT YoSEF AT TUR: HOSHEN MISHPAT 1 (Robert M.
Cover trans.)).
23. Id. at 11 (citing MISHNAH, Aboth 1:2).
24. Id. at 12 (referring to MISHNAH, Aboth 1:18).
25. Id.
26. See id.

19981
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created our normative world, with the much more general terms of
our world-maintaining Constitution."
Thus, the vagueness in the agreed-upon elements of law is
inevitable. Indeed, I see the vagueness as the feature that makes
agreement possible. Does this vagueness mean the agreement on
what counts as law is illusory? Or, put another way, is there really
any common ground? Yes, outside the circle. For example, while
substantial disagreement may - and in fact, does - exist on what
"fair procedures" means, it may simultaneously be true, and I claim
it to be true, that substantial agreement exists that some procedures are not fair. Thus, while there is substantial disagreement on
the quality of the counsel that must be provided in a criminal proceeding to qualify the proceeding as fair' and substantial disagreement on whether, and if so when, the state must provide
counsel to the indigent in a civil proceeding,29 I am confident that

27. Today it is the world-maintaining language in the preamble that is most often
." The Declaration of Independence para. 2
quoted: "All men are created equal ...
(1776). But most of the Declaration is devoted to a list of the American colonists'
grievances against King George. See id. For example, the colonists complained that: "He
[King George] has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly
firmness his invasions on the rights of the people." Id. para. 7. They also objected that
"[hie [King George] has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the
Consent of our legislature." Id. para. 13. This is what one finds at the beginning of a
normative world.
Once the normative world is created, more general principles are needed to keep
that world together, because disagreement on what a nation or a people stands for will
inevitably develop over time. Consequently, broader principles, like those found in the
Constitution of the United States with its world-maintaining language, are needed. The
deprived of life, liberty, or propConstitution guarantees that 'no person shall be ...
" U.S. CONST. art V. It also says "Congress shall
erty, without due process of law ....
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof . . . ." Id. art. I.
Thus, our basic law demonstrates the role played by culture-specific principles
and that played by world-maintaining principles.
28. See, e.g., Richard P. Rhodes, Jr., Strickland v. Washington: Safeguard of the
Capital Defendant's Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel?, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
121, 141-55 (1992) (discussing the task of defining "effective assistance of competent
counsel" in criminal proceedings); Jennifer N. Ide, Comment, The Case of Exavious Lee
Gibson: A Georgia Court's (Constitutional?)Denial of a Federal Right, 47 EMORY L.J.
1079, 1111-20 (1998) (proposing that the right to effective counsel is nonexistent, as well
as is a remedy for violating this right); Notes, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1923, 1923 (1994) (arguing
"that capital trials are so complex, and the death penalty so different in kind from other
punishments, that, for capital defendants, the Eighth Amendment requires a higher
standard of effective assistance of counsel" than indigent criminal defendants are usually
afforded).
29. See Colene Flynn, In Search of Greater Procedural Justice: Rethinking Lassiter
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all would agree that the role played by counsel in the Blackman
hypothetical is one of the features that made the proceeding at
issue unworthy of the name of law.
Similarly, while substantial disagreement exists on how much
stability is required for a system to be worthy of the name of law or
how accessible the rules must be to ordinary people, a system in
which the rules change every hour, or one in which the rules are
completely inaccessible to those expected to comply with them,
would almost surely be universally condemned as not a legal system. In short, common ground exists, and it can be found by restating Fallon's criteria in the negative.
A system is unworthy of the name of "law" when one or more of
the following assertions appears to be true:
(1) There is no way to discover or comply with the
legal rules;
(2) The "legal" system, acting through its judges and
other officials, does not require itself or others to
take the legal rules seriously;
(3) The law is completely unstable, changing moment
to moment, a constantly moving target. (This point
is fairly subsumed under the first assertion);
(4) Officials, judges, and kings are exempt from the
burden of following any particular set of rules; and
(5) Courts employ procedures that guarantee, or all
but guarantee, that the outcome will be "x" and
not "y" where the ostensible purpose of the proceedings is to decide between the outcomes "x" and
(Cy."

Few, if any, would defend a system with one or more of these
characteristics as a legal system. I cannot prove that this is so;
some things are just not easily subject to proof. I do, however, believe that agreement on what cannot be law exists, and that that

v. Department of Social Services, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 327, 338-50 (1996) (discussing
the role gender may play in the need for counsel at termination of parental rights
proceedings); Rosalie R. Young, The Right to Appoint Counsel in Termination of Parental
Rights Proceedings: The States' Response to Lassiter, 14 TOURO L. REV. 247, 266-75
(1997) (analyzing different state standards for determining the right to counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings); Peter E. Van Runlde, Comment, Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services: What It Means for the Indigent Divorce Litigant, 43 OHIO
ST. L.J. 969, 987-88 (1982) (finding that a divorce decree, like the termination of paren-

tal rights, affects fundamental individual interests; thus, an indigent divorce litigant may
have a constitutional right to counsel).
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agreement is captured by the statements above.
THE LAWLESSNESS OF CONTEMPORARY CLASS
ACTION PRACTICE
You are in a strange country, but unfortunately you are not
visiting. You live there. Class action practice in this country now
includes these features.
A. Confirmatory Discovery
Confirmatory discovery refers to discovery class-counsel conducts after agreeing to a settlement on behalf of the class and filing
that settlement with a court. It is designed to replace the discovery
that one might imagine a lawyer doing before sitting down to settle
a case. Confirmatory discovery is becoming all to commonplace in
class actions, accepted as a perfectly decent substitute for old-fashioned pre-trial or pre-settlement discovery."
B. Defendant Nomination of Class Counsel
Someone must select counsel for the class. Why not the defendant? The defendant, after all, will be forced to pay the bill for
class-counsel's services in the form of an award for attorney's fees.
Letting the defendant select its counsel and class-counsel undoubtedly aids the progress of settlement. What could possibly be wrong

30. Indeed, "confirmatory discovery" is becoming so commonplace that the term is
used without explanation in newspaper articles describing announced settlements. See,
e.g., Cygne Designs, Inc. Announces Tentative Settlement of Shareholder Claims, Bus.
WIRE, Jan. 14, 1997, available in WL, Allnewsplus File (describing settlements subject to
confirmatory discovery); Micro Warehouse, Inc. Settles Class Action Lawsuit, PR
NEWSWIRE, Sept. 3, 1997, available in WL, Allnewsplus File (broadcasting: 'The agreement [to pay thirty million dollars] is contingent on completion of confirmatory discovery . . . ."); Michael A. Riccardi, Philadelphia Lawyers Negotiate $30 Million Settlement
in Securities Class Action, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 5, 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, LGLINT File (stating: 'The company said that 'confirmatory discovery'
must take place as well as the negotiation of a detailed settlement stipulation."); SFX
BroadcastingAnnounces Settlement of Lawsuits, Bus. WIRE, Mar. 18, 1998, available in
WL, Allnewsplus File (quoting: "The settlement is conditioned on the consummation of
the merger, the completion of confirmatory discovery, and approval of the court."). For a
rare example of confirmatory discovery failing to confirm the already reached settlement,
see In re Donald Trump Casino Securities Litigation, 793 F. Supp. 543, 546 (D.N.J.
1992). Note, however, that class-counsel in that case paid dearly for discovering that he
could not "confirm" the fairness after they had already agreed to settlement; the court
dismissed the class action with prejudice. See id. at 569.
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with such an efficient procedure? Nothing, according to the courts
that have considered the matter.3 '
C. Class Actions That May Only Be Settled
Courts may approve settlements in class action cases that
would not be eligible for trial as class actions.12 In these settlement-only class actions, one may become class-counsel (and thus
become eligible for generous attorney fees) only by presenting the
defendant with a settlement that the defendant is willing to support. As John Coffee has explained, this state of affairs is likely to
lead to "reverse auctions."' By reverse auctions, Coffee means:
plaintiffs' lawyers competing against one another for the class-counsel position by submitting low bids to the defendant on behalf of the
class.' The lawyer who is willing to submit the lowest bid for the
absent class wins. In this strange country, the courts say the class
has a constitutional right to adequate counsel,35 yet they give the
defendant effective control over the plaintiffs' lawyers.
D. Class Actions That Settle Claims Before They Exist
These class actions are a special subset of the class actions that
may be settled but may not be tried. This subset includes class
actions to settle claims that are not only legally ineligible for trial
in class form, but are also legally ineligible for trial in any form.
For example, some class actions purport to settle the claims of

31. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (approving class-counsel as adequate representatives of the class, despite the fact that the
defendants "approached" class-counsel about bringing and settling the case), order vacated, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted and affd sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997); see also Ahearn v. Fibreboard, Corp., 162
F.R.D. 505, 514 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (approving class settlement reached by class lawyers
"approached" by the defendant about a "global" settlement before those lawyers purported to represent any class), affd sub nom. Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.), 90
F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted,judgment vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997), reaffd
sub nom. In re Asbestos Litig., 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom.
Ortiz v. Fibreboard, Corp., 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998).
32. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at _ 117 S. Ct. at 2247 (suggesting that class actions
not manageable for trial might nonetheless be settled in court); see also Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 386 (1996) (holding that a class action settlement
may include claims that cannot be tried in the court certifying the class).
33. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 COLUhi. L. REv. 1343, 1370-72 (1995) (describing the reverse auction phenomenon).
34. See id.

35. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940).
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people who are yet to be conceived, and those of people who have
yet to marry or even meet other members of the class. 6 The reverse auction problem exists in these cases, as in all cases in which
the class may not be certified for trial. Settlements in this subset,
however, are likely to be even more damaging to the absent class
because when claims do not yet exist, it is highly unlikely that any
absent class members will emerge to monitor class-counsel or bring
objections to the attention of the courts.
E. Defendant-Designed Alternatives to Court for the Injured
In mass tort cases, class settlements are likely to guarantee
individuals within the absent class, not money, but an alternative
to the court process, some form of non-judicial dispute resolution."
For all the reasons I have already given, the defendant, to put it
mildly, is likely to have more leverage than class-counsel in dictating the design of these alternatives to court process. Yet, no court
has ever even suggested that a set of minimum procedural safeguards be present in these alternatives. Instead, each class, receives its own "justice system," hand-crafted by the entity responsible for harming the class and class-counsel, who is likely to be
beholden to the defendant. Consequently, the justice one is due in
this strange country is, as a practical matter, often within the discretion of the defendant, the de facto designer of the alternative
system to which its victims, absent class members in a mass tort
suit, are relegated."
36. See, e.g., Flanagan, 90 F.3d at 993, 1019 (approving class settlement for class
that included children not yet conceived and spouses not yet married to class members).
37. See id. at 996 (describing the alternative dispute resolution process set up by
the settlement). For reference to other cases discussing alternative dispute resolution
processes, see Campbell v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (In re A.H. Robins Co.), No.
98-1714, 1998 WL 726751 (4th Cir. Oct. 16, 1998) (remanding the matter "[blecause the
ADR referee did not apply the Reichel proof scheme"); King v. Dalkon Shield Claimants
Trust (In re A.H. Robins Co.), No. 98-1395, 1998 WL 537715 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 1998)
(finding the Reichel proof scheme should have been applied); Dalkon Shield Claimants
Trust v. Reiser (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 972 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1992) (staying the state
claim pending a decision by the Trust to determine the cause of the plaintiffs injury
and whether the claim would qualify as an Unreleased Claim); Dalkon Shield Claimants
Trust v. Finkel (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 197 B.R. 513 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994) (determining that the Trust may challenge causation in any arbitration and finding that there are
three possible outcomes in Alternate Decision Method (ADM) arbitration: the Trust's
final offer; the claimant's final demand; and no liability); In re AH. Robins Co., 88 B.R.
742 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) (confirming Robins' Fifth Amended and Restated Plan of
Reorganization because it was proposed in good faith, not forbidden by law, and reimbursed the plaintiffs).
38. For a critique of the procedures contained in the Georgine class settlement
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F. Hearings for Show
The system pays lip service to the possibility that class counsel

and the defendant may collude to harm the absent class, particularly in settlement-only classes. 9 It is generally accepted in this
country that one may not be bound to law written by two private
parties, such as a contract, which is a settlement by definition, or a
settlement per se, unless one agrees to be bound or has authorized
another to agree on his behalf.40 Therefore, no class settlement is
binding without court approval, which is supposed to operate both
as a check on collusion and as a substitute for individual assent to
the contract's terms.41

Courts must find that the settlement is fair and reasonable,
that class-counsel has adequately represented the class and that
counsel and the defendant did not collude against the class's interest.42 While the rules of procedure do not state that a court must
hold a hearing before making these findings, hearings are routinely
held.' No rules, however, seem to govern the manner in which
these hearings are held.
The court may, for example, refuse to hear testimony.4 4 The

rejected by the Supreme Court on other grounds, see Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While
the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Aichem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045,
1107-14 (1995).
39. See, e.g., Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.
1971). The court acknowledged that when a class action is not filed until it is settled,
plaintiffs' counsel may have been "under strong pressure to conform to the defendants'
wishes," and reminded courts that they must be extra vigilant in evaluating the settlement. Id. at 33. This extra vigilance, however, seems to make little difference in the
result courts reach. In other words, almost every class settlement is approved. See infra
text accompanying notes 54-55.
40. See Derrickson v. City of Danville, 845 F.2d 715, 715-25 (7th Cir. 1988)
(discussing the essentially contractual nature of class settlements); Morgan v. South
Bend Community Sch. Corp., 797 F.2d 471, 477-79 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that judgments based on compromise hinge on actual authority of the parties to the compromise).
41. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), and its state counterparts, which
require court approval of any class action settlement or dismissal.
42. See 2 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
§ 11.25 (3d ed. 1992).
43. See id.
44. See Scot J. Paltrow, Rulings in Prudential Case Are Questioned, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 1997, at D1. In one of the largest class actions ever filed, involving a settlement by Prudential valued between $410 million and $1.9 billion, the trial judge
refused to allow those objecting to the settlement to call any witnesses at the fairness
hearing. See id. The court approved the settlement and was affirmed on appeal. Com.
pare In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450, 528
(D.N.J. 1997), affd, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998), with Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D.
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judge ruling on the fairness of the settlement may have played a
large role in creating the very settlement he is now charged with
reviewing."5 Indeed, because the hearing judge may well have met

behind closed doors with the defendant alone - or with the defendant and class-counsel - on one or more occasions prior to the
hearing, there is no way to gauge just how committed the hearing
judge may have become to the settlement prior to the "hearing."46
Even if someone objected to the settlement, neither he nor his law-

yer is likely to have been invited to these closed pre-hearing sessions between the judge and the settlement proponents." This sce-

nario, however, is just one of many obstacles placed in the path of
those foolhardy enough to challenge a class settlement.
Additionally, objectors to the settlement are routinely required
to submit their objections in writing, before the settlement proponents have submitted any papers purporting to establish an affir-

mative case for the settlement.48 The burden of establishing the
fairness of the settlement and the adequacy of the class's represen-

tation is supposedly placed on the settlement's objectors.49 Generally, those with the burden must make their case first. Thus, objectors are left in the ridiculous position of having to anticipate an

affirmative case that has yet to be made.

°

Courts, moreover, are not required to grant the objectors any

discovery. 5 Even if discovery is granted, it is likely to be limited
144, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (finding: "While an objectant must be given leave to be heard,
to examine witnesses and to submit evidence, it is within the Court's discretion to limit
the proceedings to whatever is necessary to aid it in reaching an informed, just and
reasoned decision." (citing Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1942))).
45. See Flanagan,90 F.3d at 998-1002 (5th Cir. 1996) (Smith, J., dissenting) (discussing the trial judge's involvement in the settlement he later approved and suggesting
that such involvement may violate due process, which guarantees parties an impartial
judge).
46. See Paltrow, supra note 44, at Dl (relating charges that the hearing judge
made "crucial decisions" prior to the fairness hearing in "closed, off-the-record court
hearings" for which the objectors received no notice); see also Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 515
(noting a meeting between class-counsel and the defendant's counsel held at the "court's
house," referring to the trial judge's residence).
47. See Paltrow, supra note 44, at D1.
48. I have been consulted by objecting counsel in more than 20 class actions and
in each case the objector's papers were due before those of the settlement proponents.
49. See generally NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 42, §§ 3.13 at 3-75; 3.16 at 3-93;
3.42; 7.08.
50. Moreover, judges are free to forbid objectors from filing new objections once
they have had a chance to review the proponents' case. See Paltrow, supra note 44, at
D1 (reporting on a judge's order that forbade objectors from adding new objections).
51. See Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L.
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in important respects.5 2 The best available data indicates that the
average 5fairness
hearing in federal court only takes about forty
3
minutes.
The result of these hearings is all but guaranteed. The Federal
Judicial Center studied class action practice in four federal district
courts. It found that "[alpproximately 90% or more of the proposed
settlements were approved without changes in each of the four
districts. " ' In these four districts, the courts made changes and
then approved another 8% of the settlements.55 Adding 8% to 90%
"or more" gets awfully close to a 100% settlement approval rate.
Given the "legal" process I have just described, these statistics are
not surprising.
While some might argue that I have not given settlement-only
class actions their due because I have made no effort here to explain, for example, how much fairer the alternative dispute resolution systems created by class settlements might be compared to the
present tort system, they would be missing the point. The chief
virtue of the settlement-only class action is supposed to be that its
availability makes it easier to settle class action cases. The reasoning is this: If to receive court approval of a class settlement the
defendant has to first concede that the class action could be tried,
in effect waiving all possible objections to certification, defendants
would not be as inclined to pursue settlement. What if the court
rejects the settlement? The defendant would have conceded objections to certification for nothing. In short, that is the argument.
Let us assume, however, that settlement-only classes greatly
aid settlement. How can the desire to encourage settlements justify
a procedure so likely to produce reverse auctions that result in
unfair settlements to the plaintiffs? Moreover, the settlement-only
device sits within a system in which the defendant faces virtually
no risk of settlement rejection. In short, the system is amazingly
solicitous of a fear highly unlikely to materialize. And what protects
the class from the abuse that the device might generate? The stan-

REV. 1051, 1109-10 (1996).
52. See id. (discussing various limits commonly placed on objector's discovery, most
notably forbidding inquiry into the trade-offs made during settlement negotiations).
53. Thomas E. WilIging et al., Federal Judicial Center, Empirical Study of Class

Actions in Four Federal District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules 169 tbl.19 (1996) (copy on file with author).
54. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
55. See id. at 178 tbl.38 (showing that changes were made in 9 of 117 settlements).
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dard argument is court review of the settlement. Oh yes, the
fairness hearing will save the class from collusive settlements. Who
could doubt the efficacy of hearings as a means of protecting the
absent class when those hearings are conducted in the manner I
have described above?
As to the argument that the alternative dispute resolution
systems created by class settlements might be fairer to injured individuals than the current tort system, nothing about the process for
approving these alternatives suggests that would be true. But, let
us assume it is true. And while we are at it, let us assume that the
judge and all his peers described in Blackman's story sentence to
prison only those whom we all would agree, if later we learned the
facts, deserved imprisonment. So what? The fact that a process
reaches a result we think is right is surely not sufficient to justify
calling that process law. If it were, some lynchings would be worthy
of the name "law" also. Thus, even if the alternative dispute resolution system actually served the interests of tort victims better
than our present tort system, that fact would not justify the process
courts are using to create those systems.
None of the features of contemporary class action practice belong in a legal system, not individually and surely not in combination. Let us return to my criteria. Are the rules knowable? Absent
class members who wish to object to the settlement proposed for
them cannot discover the legal rules or attempt to comply with
them. What, if any, information are the absent class members entitled to and when? No answer. What rights, if any, do the absent
class members have at the fairness hearing? No answer. What
procedure, if any, must the judge follow before finding that the
objections of the absent class members are without merit? No answer.
Do judges take rules seriously? The mere fact that no court has
even attempted to delineate what must be done at a fairness hearing for its result to be considered law is telling. No court has, for
example, attempted to articulate the rights of objectors. Everything
about the process is discretionary. Does the law change from moment to moment? A system in which almost every matter is entrusted to the court's discretion is precisely that variable.
While one might quibble about whether the features of the
class action practice I have described are bad enough to meet the
first three criteria, there can be little argument about the last two.
Judges in contemporary class action practice are all but exempt
from the burden of following any particular set of rules. Even more
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damning, all the procedures I have described, from confirmatory
discovery to hearings before partial judges, are designed to guarantee one outcome and one outcome only: settlement approval. As
the Federal Judicial Center's own statistics demonstrate, the system is virtually incapable of producing a contrary outcome, incapable of rejecting a class action settlement. 6
Consequently, one corner of our court system is well-nigh lawless. It matters not how well-intentioned the judges and lawyers
are who helped create this state of affairs. It must end. The experiment has gone awry.
CONCLUSION
Academics spend a lot of time trying to impress one another.
What legal academics find impressive is a subtle mind, nuanced
thinking, and eyes that can see grey in what appears to be the
blackest black. Alas, not everything is grey.
The past is not unique in having witnessed great wrongs, even
though every present generation is inclined to think just that. Nevertheless, injustice lives in the present too. It always has, and it always will. There are still things in our world that warrant strong
condemnation. Does this essay address the worst of all present
wrongs? Of course not. But lawlessness may spread, particularly if
a "good result" is all that is necessary to excuse it. There will be
time enough for nuanced thinking once the problem has been acknowledged and the search for solutions has begun in earnest.
First, however, must come the alarm.
In the end, I say to my academic colleagues, speaking out
against the powers that be is what tenure is for. Use it - if not on
this problem, on another. Risk something. To my colleagues at the
bar, I say our "independence" from the state, like tenure, is supposed to serve some purpose. Where are you?

56. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.

